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The Constitutional Framework and the
Current Political Crisis in India*
By VED P. NANDA**
I. The Nature of the Crisis
On June 26, 1975, the president of India, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed,
proclaimed a state of emergency.' He invoked his constitutional preroga-
tive under which he is empowered to declare a "Proclamation of Emer-
gency" if he is "satisfied" that a "grave emergency" exists or is immi-
nent, threatening "the security of India or any part of the territory
thereof. . . whether by war or external aggression or internal disturb-
ance .... ... In this case, for the first time since the Constitution of
independent India came into force on January 26, 1950, the rationale
for the action was the threat of internal disturbances.3 In accordance
with the extraordinary constitutional powers bestowed upon the govern-
ment of India following such presidential action,4 Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's government arrested and jailed thousands of political oppo-
nents,6 imposed strict censorship of the press,6 suspended civil liberties, 7
banned several dissident parties, s and sought to consolidate its power by
@ Copyright 1975, Ved P. Nanda
* The paper reflects events in India as of August 11, 1975. I am grateful to
my colleagues William Beaney, Neil Littlefield and Lawrence Tiffany for reading a draft
of this paper, however, I alone am responsible for the views presented here.
** Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver-College of Law.
1. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 1, col. 8; Washington Post, June 27, 1975, at
A-1, col. 5.
2. CoNST. oF INDIA arts. 358-59 (1950).
3. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 12, col. 3.
4. CONST. OF INDA arts. 358-59 (1950).
5. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1975, at 1, col. 5; id., Aug. 5, 1975, at 10, col. 3; Rocky
Mountain News, Aug. 3, 1975, at 24, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as R.M. News]; id., Aug.
7, 1975, at 46, col. 1.
6. Washington Post, June 27, 1975, at A-18, col. 2; Christian Science Monitor,
June 30, 1975, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as C.S. Monitor]; id., July 23, 1975, at 28,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 28, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
7. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1975, at 1, coL 6; id., July 3, 1975, at 1, col. 3; id., July
25, 1975, at 3, col. 1; Denver Post, June 29, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
8. R.M. News, July 5, 1975, at 3, col. 3; Denver Post, July 7, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
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enacting laws, including constitutional amendments.9 Since several
members of the Parliament of India were under arrest and others
boycotted the July parliamentary session in protest against Mrs. Gan-
dhi's actions, which they denounced as authoritarian and designed to
destroy democracy,'0 there was virtually no opposition to the legislation
introduced by Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party."
The newly enacted constitutional amendments are intended specifi-
cally to curtail the scope of judicial review. Thus, the state of emergency
is made a nonjusticiable issue, for one of the amendments explicitly
states that the courts cannot adjudicate presidential proclamations of
emergency.' 2 Similarly, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, in
force since the 1971 declaration of emergency proclaimed at the time of
the India-Pakistan war, has been removed from judicial scrutiny.' 3 And
finally, election laws were changed retroactively, eliminating the possi-
bility of a judicial hearing on challenges to elections of four high
government officials-the prime minister, the president, the vice-presi-
dent and the speaker of the house.14 Separate legislation passed by the
Parliament of India leaves the matter of disqualification from office
after conviction for violation of election laws to the discretion of India's
president.' 5 The last two enactments mentioned above would nullify
Mrs. Gandhi's conviction by the Allahabad high court for violations
during her 1971 election campaign, the conviction that triggered the
current political crisis.' 6
Mrs. Gandhi's strong-arm tactics in the suppression of her political
opponents have elicited widespread criticism.' 7 It could be argued that
her justification for taking drastic measures, for abandoning what she
9. See notes 11-14 infra.
10. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id., Aug. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 3; R.M.
News, July 24, 1975, at 44, col. 1; id., Aug. 6, 1975, at 27, col. 1; Denver Post, July
23, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
11. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1975, at 3, col. 1; id., Aug. 9, 1975, at 3, col. 1; R.M.
News, Aug. 6, 1975, at 27, col. 1; C.S. Monitori Aug. 6, 1975, at 6, col. 1.
12. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 6, col. 3; id., July 25, 1975, at 3, col. 1; C.S.
Monitor, July 30, 1975, at 2, col. 1; Denver Post, July 24, 1975, at 6, col. 5; id., Aug. 7,
1975, at 11, col. 2.
13. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1975, at 3, col. 7.
14. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1975, at 3, col. 1; R.M. News, Aug. 9, 1975, at 34, col.
1; Denver Post, Aug. 5, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
15. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 2, col. 4; Denver Post, Aug. 5, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
16. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., June 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 28, 1975, at 8, col. 6; id., July 28, 1975, at 20,
col. 1; Washington Post, July 23, 1975, at A-14, col. 1; C.S. Monitor, July 1, 1975, at
28, col. 1; Nanda, India Suffers an Aberration, R.M. News, July 6, 1975, (Trend), at
2, col. 1.
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called "a democracy of sorts" in India'8 -that "the threat of disruption
was clear and imminent ' 19 -is self-serving. Thus, it could be asserted
that the suspension of civil liberties under the cloak of constitutional
authorization is unwarranted, that the fatal flaw in Mrs. Gandhi's logic
in invoking the wisdom of India's Founding Fathers "to provide for
extraordinary situations" under which the government has purportedly
acted,20 lies in her utter disregard for the spirit of the Constitution. Her
government has failed to make a persuasive case for the suspension of
fundamental rights so explicitly enumerated and detailed in the Indian
Constitution. 2 Similarly, the government's hastily enacted legislation,
designed to deny the courts the right of judicial review-a right specifi-
cally granted under the Indian Constitution2 -violates the basic tenet
of a democratic check on the executive or legislative powers. By depriv-
ing the citizenry of their most essential protection against an attempted
usurpation of powers, Mrs. Gandhi's government has taken an undemo-
cratic and undesirable step.
The underlying causes of the recent political crisis in India and
their impact on Asian and world politics are bound to be subject to
varying interpretations and will surely be watched and analyzed by
political observers. Intriguing questions pertaining to the public re-
sponse to the emergency measures and to the shape of India's politics in
the future deserve serious investigation by all concerned. Two of those
questions, both presented within a constitutional framework but with
wide-ranging political implications, will be briefly analyzed here. They
relate to the nature of the emergency provisions and the scope of judicial
review in the Indian Constitution. After exploring these questions within
a historical and a narrow comparative setting, a few scenarios are
presented and their implications discussed. The discussion concludes
with a few observations on the role of the legal profession and legal
institutions in a developing country, such as India, which is torn by
serious economic, social and political tensions.
H. Emergency Provisions in the Constitution of India
Unlike the United States Constitution, which has no specific provi-
sion for dealing with emergency conditions,28 India's Constitution vests
18. SATURDAY R V., Aug. 9, 1975, at 10, col. 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 48, col. 1.
21. CONST. oF IND A arts. 12-35 (1950). For a perceptive commentary see G.
Austin, Thg IDiAN CONsTuToN: CONERSONE OF A NATON 50-115 (1966).
22. See, e.g., CoNsT. oF INDIA arts. 131-36 (1950).
23. The United States Supreme Court has often said that extraordinary conditions
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the president with extraordinary powers to declare an emergen-
cy.24 In addition to the president's power to declare an emergency when
"satisifed" that there is a threat or imminent threat to India's security,25
other provisions allow such a proclamation in case of a failure of the
constitutional machinery in a state of India.2 If "satisfied" that a
situation has arisen in which the government of the state cannot be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India,
the president may assume the executive powers of the state while India's
Parliament may assume legislative powers.27 Also, the president, on
being "satisfied" that the financial stability or credit of India is threat-
ened, may declare a financial emergency.28 The powers are extraordi-
nary, since pursuant to such a proclamation the government of India is
empowered to assume federal coercive powers over the states.29 And, in
emergencies proclaimed by the president other than financial emergen-
cies, the government is authorized to take measures suspending some or
all of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 0 While
the emergency provisions on the failure of the constitutional machinery
in a state have often been invoked, 1 raising interesting questions of
federal-state relations, the discussion here is confined to the emergency
provisions under article 352 of the Constitution of India relating to
India's security. Only twice before has the president exercised this
power. Both of these occasions involved external conflict situations-
once during the India-China conflict in 1962 and secondly during the
Bangladesh crisis in 1971.
The president's powers in article 352 are similar to the governor
general's powers under the British rule. However, while the Government
of India Act, 1935, gave the chief executive complete discretion to
declare a proclamation of emergency,32 the president is required to
exercise the power under the advice of the cabinet ministers, for under
the parliamentary system of government operative in India the real
do not create or enlarge constitutional power. E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
24. CONST. OF INDIA arts. 352, 356, 360 (1950).
25. Id. art 352.
26. Id. art. 356.
27. Id. arts. 356-57.
28. Id. art. 360.
29. Id. arts. 353-54, 56-57, 60.
30. Id. arts. 358-59.
31. A. HANSON & J. DOuGLAS, IriA's DEMOCuACY 121-22 (1972).
32. See 2 D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF INDIA 538 (3d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as D. BAsu].
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power rests in the prime minister while the president is for all practical
purposes a mere figurehead.33
These emergency powers are a product of the special circumstances
prevalent in India at the time the Constituent Assembly met from De-
cember 9, 1946 to November 26, 1949. The cold war had already begun
which, in the words of a noted jurist and former chief justice of the Su-
preme Court of India, Gajendragadkar, made the framers of the Consti-
tution apprehensive that "an external threat, either of a military or of an
ideological character, may have to be faced by India; and so they were
anxious to provide for emergency powers which would enable the Union
Government to put the whole of the country on a war-footing and to
enable it to face any possible danger."3 4 In addition, the country's safety,
unity and integrity were challenged on many fronts-unprecedented
Hindu-Moslem riots had shaken the very fabric of society; Maharajas
and Nawabs of princely states were intransigent, vocally advocating sep-
aration; lawlessness and terrorism were rampant in some states; and the
division of India into India and Pakistan had led to the creation of an
unfriendly state borderlining the western and the eastern sides of India.
Thus the raison d'etre of the provisions was that the nation faced grave
and difficult times.35 Commenting on these provisions, Gajendragad-
kar has recently remarked that the object "clearly is to safeguard the
integrity and unity of, and the rule of law in, India and not to allow any
emergency to affect them."3 That explains why there was no opposition
in the Constituent Assembly to article 362.
The serious consequences flowing from the issuance of a proclama-
tion authorized by this article include the immediate suspension of
article 19 which guarantees a citizen's right to seven specified
freedoms-speech and expression, assembly, association, movement,
residence, acquisition, holding and disposal of property, and practicing
any profession and carrying on of any occupation, trade or business.
The legislative and the executive branches of the government assume the
power to make any law or to take any executive action, notwithstanding
article 19 provisions.3" The rationale seems to be that in modern wars,
fought on ideological bases, internal subversive activities are likely to
pose as grave a threat to a country's security as does external aggression.
33. See CONsT. OF INDIA arts. 74-75 (1950); 1 D. BASU, supra note 32, at 471-73.
34. P.B. GAEND.AGADKAt, TE CONSTITUTION OF 'INDIA: ITS PHMOSOPHY AND
BAsic POSTULATE 68 (1969) [hereinafter cited as P.B. GAJENDRAGADKA].
35. Id.
36. Id. at 73.
37. See CONST. OF INDIA arts. 356, 358-59 (1950).
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Although other fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Consti-
tution are not subject to automatic suspension, the president is author-
ized to make an order declaring that:
[t]he right to move any court for the enforcement of such of
the rights conferred by Part III [Bill of Rights entrenching funda-
mental rights into the Constitution] as may be mentioned in the
order and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement
of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation is in force .... 38
The far-reaching consequence affecting civil rights is that they become
unenforceable. Thus, the right to obtain orders and directions or
prerogative writs from the courts for the enforcement of these rights
is suspended while the proclamation is in operation or for such shorter
period as may be specified in the presidential order.
Two safeguards are provided in the Constitution. First, the Consti-
tution provides that the proclamation ceases to operate unless approved
by each House of Parliament within two months.39 Second, it re-
quires that a presidential order suspending fundamental rights (with
the exception of article 19 freedoms) be presented to each House of
Parliament "as soon as may be after it is made,"" which means "as early
as is reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case."'41
Contrary to the provisions found in other constitutions, the suspen-
sion of fundamental rights in emergencies allowed by the Indian Consti-
tution makes no distinction between times of war and peace. For
example, article 1, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution
provides for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus but only "when
in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." It is
submitted that if the emergency provisions in the Indian Constitution
are to enable "the Union Government to put the nation on a war footing
if an emergency either occurs or its threat is imminent,"42 as asserted by
Garjendragadkar, the actions taken by Mrs. Gandhi's government are in
violation of the spirit of the Constitution.
HI. The Scope of Judicial Review
The judicial provisions of the Constitution pertaining to the ap-
pointment of the judges and their tenure, salaries and removal are
38. Id. art. 359.
39. Id. art. 356 § 3.
40. Id. art. 359.
41. BAsu, supra note 32, at 552.
42. P.B. GA.EDRAGADKAR, supra note 34, at 71.
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designed to ensure an independent judiciary.43 While the Constituent
Assembly adopted a system of parliamentary government based on the
English model, it also accepted to a limited extent the United States
doctrine of judicial review. Thus, unlike the English Parliament, the
Parliament of India is not a sovereign body, for the judiciary, the
interpreter of the Constitution, is specifically empowered to declare a
law unconstitutional if (1) it is in contravention of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or (2) it is beyond the compe-
tence of the legislature according to the distribution of powers provided
by the Constitution. Limitations on the rights specifically enumerated in
article 19 are subject to judicial review for reasonableness. However,
when the emergency provisions are invoked the cpurts are powerless to
intervene. Thus, the judiciary, which-unlike the United States
system-is a centralized structure with India's Supreme Court at the
apex and the state high courts subject to the Supreme Court's supervi-
sion, lacks the preeminent role it plays in the United States political
system. As a leading lawyer and a prominent member of the Constitu-
ent Assembly, A.K. Ayyar said:
While there can be no two opinions on the need for the mainten-
ance of judicial independence, both for the safeguarding of in-
dividual liberty and the proper working of the Constitution, it is
also necessary to keep in view one important principle. The doc-
trine of independence is not to be raised to the level of a dogma so
as to enable the Judiciary to function as a kind of super-Legisla-
ture or super-Executive. The Judiciary is there to interpret the
Constitution or adjudicate upon the rights between the parties con-
cerned. .... . 4
Similar remarks were made by former prime minister, Jawahar Lal
Nehru, deputy prime minister, V. B. Patel and G. V. Pant. During
the deliberations in the Constituent Assembly on the right to property
and the issue of compensation, especially in the context of land reform
(land acquisition of big landlords for public purposes), Nehru said that
"no Supreme Court and no Judiciary can stand in judgment over the
sovereign will of Parliament representing the will of the entire com-
munity. ' 45 Pant had earlier shown his displeasure concerning the pro-
posed inclusion of substantive due process in the Constitution, for he
was in favor of the determination of the future of the country by "the
collective wisdom of the representatives of the people" but not by "the
43. G. AusTN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSrONE OF A NATION 176
(1966) [hereinafter cited as G. AusTri].
44. Id. at 174.
45. Id. at 99.
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fiats of those elevated to the Judiciary." 0 Since communal disorders
were a major problem confronting the country, he warned that "[tjo
fetter the discretion of the Legislature would lead to anarchy." 47 Subse-
quently, during the discussion of due process in the context of land re-
form, Patel pointed out the danger that "a certain old type of judges
may misinterpret this new process of law."
48
These remarks by Ayyar, Nehru, Pant and Patel are indicative of
the apprehension the framers of the Constitution had about a powerful
judiciary which in their estimation could slow down the much needed
socioeconomic reforms. In this connection, constitution adviser, B. N.
Rau, was strongly influenced by the advice given by Justice Frankfurter
(whom he visited in the United States) that the power of judicial review
as implied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution
was undemocratic because a few judges could veto legislation enacted by
elected representatives.49 Justice Frankfurter also considered the power
burdensome to the judiciary.50 Thus, although there was no mention of
due process in the Constitution in connection with the right of life and
personal liberty,51 certain constraints were imposed on the power of the
legislature. 52 However, as the following discussion shows, the
judicial-executive-legislative confrontation, feared by the framers of the
Constitution, did develop rather early and continues not only to aggra-
vate the existing tensions within the body politic but to engender some
new ones as well.
The major confrontation began in 1951 with a state high court's
decision53 invalidating a state land reform law for its violation of the
right to equality. The government of India responded by amending the
Constitution. 54 Since then several amendments have been enacted negat-
ing judicial interpretation on the rights to property, including the ade-
quacy of compensation, guaranteed under article 31 of the Constitution.
A significant part of the legacy left by the first two decades of the
constitutional history of independent India for the future historian will
surely include a record of heated debates in Parliament and lengthy
opinions by various supreme court justices on these issues.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 175.
49. Id. at 103.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 102. See CoNsr. OF INDIA art. 21.
52. G. AusTIN, supra note 43, at 109-10. See CoNsr. OF INDrA art. 22.
53. Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, 38 All India Rptr. 91 (Patna 1951).
54, CONST. OF INDIA arts. 31 A-B (1951, as amended 1955).
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In a landmark decision in 1967, Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,"
the Supreme Court challenged the Parliament's power to amend the
Constitution. It held by a narrow majority of six to five that the word
"law" in article 13 (2) which states that any law made by the state
which "takes away or abridges" fundamental rights would be void,
applies with equal force to a constitutional amendment. Thus Parlia-
ment's power to amend the Constitution was limited by article 13 (2)
and a constitutional amendment which would take away or abridge the
fundamental rights would itself be void. However, the majority applied
the doctrine of prospective overruling and the amendments already
adopted were allowed to remain as valid laws. Since Golak Nath the
conflict between the judiciary and Parliament has further intensified.
The major controversy centers around which of these institutions has the
final say pertaining to the nature and scope of fundamental rights.
The government waited for four years following Golak Nath before
accepting the Supreme Court challenge. Now that Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's Congress party had swept the polls in the 1971 elections, the
government was assured of a comfortable margin in both houses to
amend the Constitution. The 24th amendment explicitly stated that
nothing in article 13 would apply to any amendment of the Constitution
made under article 368, the amendment article, which requires a two-
thirds majority of the total membership of each house present and voting
in favor of a bill, and in no case less than a majority of the total
membership of each house, before it could be presented for the presi-
dent's assent.
Article 368 was changed to make clear that nothing in the Consti-
tution, including article 13, would apply to the power of Parliament,
made "in exercise of its constituent power" to amend the Constitution.
Also, the giving of assent was made obligatory upon the president. Soon
thereafter, the 25th amendment was adopted, changing the word
"compensation" in article 13, to the nonnormative word "amount"
because the former had been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean
the just equivalent of the "acquired property. '56
During the amendment's debate in Parliament, proponents made
statements to the effect that Parliament was asserting its supremacy to
remove judicial hurdles in the way of the government's implementation
55. 54 All India Rptr. 1643 (S. Ct. 1967).
56. See, e.g., Vajravelu v. Special Duty Collector, 52 All India Rptr. 1017 (S. Ct.
1964). For a commentary, see Sathe, Judicial Review in India: Limits and Policy, 35
Omo Sr. L.J. 870, 882 (1974).
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of its program of socioeconomic reforms.Y7 The few opponents warned
that if Parliament had unrestricted power, it might be abused and that if
the amendments were approved, not only the right to property, but other
fundamental rights would be in jeopardy as well.""
The next round began with the Supreme Court's decision to hear
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,59 in which the petitioners
challenged the validity of the 24th and 25th amendments. The largest
bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of thirteen judges, heard the
case. By a majority of ten to three, the court overruled Golak Nath. The
majority held that an amendment of the Constitution was constitutional
law which is to be distinguished from ordinary law, that the word "law"
in article 13 (2) applies to ordinary law and not to constitutional law,
and that an amendment of the Constitution was not, therefore, within
the scope of article 13 (2).
On the crucial issue as to the scope of Parliament's power to amend
the Constitution, seven judges held that Parliament's power of constitu-
tional amendment was not unlimited and that, through judicial review,
the limits were to be enforced. However, six judges held to the contrary
that there were no such limits, although three of the six judges holding
this view doubted that such power included the power to repeal or
abrogate the entire Constitution at one stroke. Among the seven judges
who found limits on Parliament's power to amend the Constitution, six
found implied limitations on destruction of the "basic structure!' or
"basic features" of the Constitution. Among the features recognized as
basic are sovereign and democratic federal republic, supremacy of the
Constitution, separation of powers, and basic freedoms of the individual.
The seventh judge went only so far as to suggest that such power did not
include the power to repeal or abrogate the entire Constitution. All
thirteen judges upheld the 24th amendment, but their opinions differed
on the correct scope of judicial review on the issue of compensation,
notwithstanding the 25th amendment.
IV. Appraisal and Recommendation
The summary review presented in the preceding sections is de-
signed to provide a factual background and historical context with
which to examine the nature and implications of the current crisis. At its
July session, Parliament has passed several more constitutional amend-
57. Id. at 878-80, 883-84.
58. See id. at 880, 884.
59. 60 All India Rptr. 1461 (S. Ct. 1973). For an incisive commentary, see
SATHE, supra note 56.
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ments.80 The Supreme Court is again faced with the dilemma of passing
on the validity of a constitutional amendment-an amendment which
bars the jurisdiction of the courts over any lawsuit challenging the
election of four high government officials, including the prime minis-
ter.61 It also provides that any court judgment involving the prime
minister "shall be deemed always to have been void and of no effect."
8' 2
At the Supreme Court hearing on August 11, 1975, on the appeal from
the Allahabad high court's conviction of Mrs. Gandhi for violation of
election laws, the attorney challenging the validity of the amendment
cited Kesavananda Bharati in support of his contention that the amend-
ment "makes an institutional change that is beyond the powers of
Parliament.""3 The argument suggested by Kesavananda Bharati is that
since the amendment dilutes the powers of the courts, especially that of
the Supreme Court, an institution enshrined in the Constitution, it tends
to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. The majority in.Kesavan-
anda Bharati held that any alteration in the basic form of the Constitu-
tion was an invalid exercise of Parliament's power to amend the Consti-
tution.
During the recent parliamentary session, suggestions were made
that Parliament might "have to have a look at the Constitution."' 4 The
law minister has hinted that further constitutional amendments may be
made to assure the supremacy of Parliament. 5 Government legal ex-
perts have reportedly been studying several countries' constitutions with
a view to suggesting basic changes in India's Constitution. 8 These
changes would be aimed at further centralization of the government's
power. Reportedly, there are several alternatives being considered,
ranging from a strong presidential system based on one-party rule to
making several small changes in the present constitution without
rescinding it. If the government decides to make basic changes in the
present constitutional structure, the existing Parliament may be trans-
formed into a Constituent Assembly. Since Mrs. Gandhi's Congress
party holds an overwhelming majority in both houses as they are pres-
ently constituted, a new Constitution framed by these members will be
imprinted with the Congress party philosophy. However, even if no
60. See notes 12-14 supra.
61. See note 14 supra.
62. Id.
63. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1975, at 10, col. 3; R.M. News, Aug. 12, 1975, at 28,
col. 1.
64. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 2, col. 4; R.M. News, Aug. 7, 1975, at 46, col. 1.
65. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
66. R.M. News, Aug. 14, 1975, at 47, col. 1.
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changes in the basic structure are undertaken in the near future, some
constitutional amendments are still likely. Such changes might include
further curtailment of fundamental freedoms, especially the freedom of
the press, further abridgment of fundamental rights if they are consid-
ered to be in conflict with implementation of the directive principles
of state policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution"7 and further
downgrading of judicial review.
Mrs. Gandhi's statement justifying the proclamation of emergency
powers 8 and statements by other spokesmen of the government, such as
the ambassador of India to the United States,69 suggest that the present
struggle in India is between conservative and reactionary forces repre-
sented by various opposition parties and those of reform led by Mrs.
Gandhi. The judiciary is maligned by some in the government as
consisting of elitists who represent the status quo and whose major
interest lies in protecting the untrammelled right to property. There are
no facts to support these specious arguments. To recall the recent past,
these arguments have been handily used as a ploy by many governments
in Africa and Asia during the last two decades to destroy parliamentary
democracies established earlier on the English model and to assume
totalitarian power. The government of India seems to be using similar
tactics.
To analyze briefly the judicial-legislative confrontation, two initial
points need to be made. First, Parliamentary action in India as a
practical matter means action by one political party, the ruling Congress
party which has been in power continuously since India's independence
in 1947; and second, the struggle between the judicial and the legislative
institutions is not ideological, for the judges consider themselves as the
protectors of the Constitution and not as a special interest group. In fact,
the judiciary is proud of its role as the arbiter between the mighty
executive and legislative branches of the government on the one hand
and the lowly individual and weak minorities seeking the enforcement of
basic constitutional rights on the other. Judicial pronouncements in
nullifying legislative actions have invariably been prompted by the fear
of further abridgment of civil rights and further curtailment of judicial
review. Also, since the Constitution of India is detailed and specific, the
67. CONST. OF INDIA arts. 36-51 (1950). See note 61 supra. These policy direc-
tives, which are primarily socioeconomic, are not enforceable. However, "it [is] the
duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws." CONST. oF INDIA art 37
(1950).
68. Supra note 18, at 10.
69. Kaul, In Which Reasons for the State of Emergency Are Explained and De-
fended, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1975, at 21, col. 1.
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judiciary has minimal discretion and cannot be creative and active as
their counterpart in the United States has been. Further legislative
curtailment of the little discretion that the judiciary possesses will allow
the unchecked assumption of power by Parliament, inviting despotism,
arbitrariness and abuse.
Unfortunately, the legal profession and legal institutions in India
have never been forces of economic and social change, and law has at
best played a marginal role in the shaping of society.70 Certainly the
legal profession, especially the judiciary, needs to act as a cohesive force
to see that law is accepted and used as a means of social control.
However, politicians may all too easily cultivate and manipulate a
distrust of lawyers among the populace and use the judiciary as a
scapegoat for the prevalence of social ills. Many observers, in their
oversimplification of problems in India, mistakenly conclude that the
present ills stem from the costly luxury of democracy in which India has
indulged for the last quarter of a century. But to suggest that the answer
to India's problems lies in more centralization is to miss the point. The
problems of India and of many developing countries are caused by a
host of related factors-leadership, policy formulation, management
and implementation, as well as current international institutions and
policies pertaining to trade, aid and financing.
The proclamation of emergency seems to have been used as a
camouflage to divert attention from the real problems. The social ten-
sions in India are symptomatic of larger ills plaguing the body politic.
Prevailing trends toward totalitarianism in India demonstrate total disre-
gard for the existing constitutional framework, although thus far there
has been compliance with the letter of the law. While India as a
developing country faces severe economic and social problems and
tensions mount within the body politic, the answer to her problems lies
not in further erosion of civil rights and individual freedoms or in the
curtailment of judicial review, but in solving the crisis of leadership
brought about by those who have been continuously in power for over
twenty-eight years.
Addendum
On November 8, 1975, Mrs. Gandhi's position was vindicated as
the Supreme Court of India reversed her conviction in the High Court
of Allahabad, basing its ruling on the retroactive changes in the election
law made by the Parliament of India in June, 1975. 7' This outcome
70. Von Mehren, Law and Legal Education in India: Some Observations, 79 HAiv.
L. REv. 1180, 1183 (1965).
71. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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does not affect the foregoing analysis, as the Supreme Court invalidated
a constitutional amendment which would have further shielded the
prime minister's election from judicial review." Three justices of the
special five justice panel voted to nullify that section of the law which
would have prevented courts from reviewing the elections of four high
government officials, -including the prime minister.78
Clearly, the dynamics involved in the legislative-executive-judicial
relationships have a considerable potential of significantly affecting the
future developments on the Indian political scene. These relationships
need to be closely watched.
72. 1d.
73. Id.
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